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█ Abstract In this paper, I will take into account and criticize two of the most celebrated neuroscientific 
experiments about free will, which seem to deny that agents freely deliberate about simple choices of their 
everyday life: the pioneering experiment of Benjamin Libet and the more recent one of John Dylan Hayes. 
My aim is to reject the relevance of their empirical results, which deny the existence of free will. However, 
such a rejection will not rely on criticisms about how the experiments are conducted. Instead, I would like 
to bring about a broad philosophical and methodological concern: namely, that the success or the failure 
of the experiments in arguing for the illusion of free will is strictly dependent on the meaning of the notion 
of free will which is put through an experimental investigation. 
KEYWORDS: Free Will; Neuroscience; Experimental Investigation; Benjamin Libet; Dylan Hayes. 
 
█ Riassunto Di cosa parlano le neuroscienze quando parlano di libero arbitrio? – In questo articolo mi oc-
cuperò criticamente di due tra i più noti esperimenti neuroscientifici sul libero arbitrio, i quali paiono 
negare che gli agenti possano liberamente prendere decisioni, anche molto semplici, nel corso della vita 
quotidiana: il pionieristico esperiemento di Benjamin Libet e quello più recente di John Dylan Hayes. In-
tendo mettere in discussione la rilevanza dei loro risultati empirici che negano l’esistenza del libero arbit-
rio. Questo rifiuto non sarà basato su una critica del modo in cui questi esperimenti sono stati condotti. 
Vorrei piuttosto portare l’attenzione su una questione più ampia da un punto di vista filosofico e metodo-
logico: il successo o il fallimento degli esperimenti nell’affermare l’illusione del libero arbitrio è stretta-
mente dipendente dal significato della nozione di libero arbitrio che messa sotto indagine da un punto di 
vista sperimentale. 




IMAGINE YOU ARE ATTENDING A talk. When 
the debate starts you feel the desire to join 
the discussion; accordingly, you raise a fin-
ger, and wait for your turn. Intuitively, the 
act of raising a finger is a very simple one: 
you can easily perform it, and you certainly 
perceive it as a result of a conscious delibera-
tion of yours to say something in that debate. 
However, if one looks at the brain’s activities 
underlying the act of raising a finger, they 
seem to suggest something different: that our 
intuitive idea that such an action is “free”- 
namely, that one’s raising a finger is the re-
sult of one’s own free will and conscious acti-
vity – is mistaken. 
The pioneering experiments performed by 
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the neuroscientist Benjamin Libet in the 80s1 
aimed to investigate the ability to exercise free 
will and they precisely took into account the 
simple act of raising a finger. Following Libet’s 
experiments, different neuroscientific studies 
have tried to shed light on the faculty of free 
agency by means of an experimental approach.2 
Neuroscientific studies ask an important 
question: whether it is true that rational agents 
exercise some form of conscious control over 
their decisions or actions. The picture offered 
in response to this question is, most of the time, 
a negative one: agents do not possess a consci-
ous control over their decisions and actions, 
even the simple one of raising a finger, because 
a person’s brain seems to initiate decisions be-
fore she becomes aware of having made them. 
Moreover, neuroscientists go further and de-
duce from the empirical findings that a plausib-
le idea of free will – namely that we consciously 
cause and perform our own decisions and ac-
tions – is inconsistent with experiential data: it 
is, it is said, an illusion.3  
In recent years, such neuroscientific re-
sults have raised a big clamour: a copious 
number of non-specialized magazines have 
indeed reported the data and given the 
alarming news that we are just machines 
without freedom.4 Nonetheless, according to 
the vast majority of philosophers, the results 
the experiments bring about are strongly cont-
roversial, and surely not conclusive in proving 
the illusory nature of free will.5 Such a negati-
ve assessment is mostly due to several empiri-
cal and conceptual inaccuracies detected in 
the experiments by philosophical analyses.  
In this paper, I will take into account and 
criticize two of the most celebrated neurosci-
entific experiments about free will, which 
seem to deny that agents freely deliberate 
about simple choices of their everyday life: 
the pioneering experiment of Benjamin Libet 
and the more recent one of John Dylan 
Hayes.6  
My aim is to reject the relevance of their 
empirical results. However, such a rejection will 
not rely on criticisms about how the experi-
ments are conducted. Instead, I would like to 
bring about a broad philosophical and metho-
dological concern: namely, that the success or 
the failure of the experiments in arguing for the 
illusion of free will is strictly dependent on the 
meaning of the notion of free will which is put 
through an experimental investigation.  
In other words, “free will” can mean vari-
ous things, and even neuroscientists, impli-
citly or explicitly, tend to rely on particular 
philosophical theses about free will before set-
ting the experiments. The validity of the ex-
perimental findings, then, is deeply depen-
dent on the particular conception of free will 
which is previously embraced. I aim to shed 
light on the meanings of free will which Libet 
and Haynes seem to take for granted, and to 
contextualize them in the philosophical de-
bate about free will. As a result, I will show 
that such notions of free will are firstly cont-
roversial from a philosophical point of view. 
Accordingly, I will show that in both cases it 
is possible to reject the experiments’ results 
by simply opposing to them two alternative 
understandings of free will, which are not 
challenged at all by the empirical findings. 
 
█ Libet’s experiment 
 
Benjamin Libet’s pioneering experiments 
in the 80s7 intended to show that a serious 
trouble for the existence of free will is hidden 
in the notion of conscious will. Libet’s experi-
ments concern not only the question as to 
whether something (such as a pre-determined 
chain of events) causes our will, but mainly 
whether there is something like a conscious 
will which causes anything; that is, if there is 
something like a conscious will which is effi-
cacious in causing our willed actions.  
First, I will briefly describe the empirical 
setting of the experiment. Then, I will clarify 
the hidden theoretical framework that Libet 
seems to take for granted in his experiment. 
As a result, I will show that Libet’s interpreta-
tion of the empirical data as evidence that 
free will is an illusion relies on a specific phi-
losophical characterization of free will: in-
compatibilism. Accordingly, I will object this 
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position and I will show that it is possible to 
defend a notion of free will which is not thre-
atened by Libet’s empirical discoveries. My 
aim, then, is to argue that it is not certain 
that Libet’s empirical findings are able to 
show that free will is an illusion. 
 
█ The experimental setting 
 
Libet’s experiments were designed to ex-
plore the role of conscious intentions in the 
production of voluntary actions. Indeed, he 
has experimentally investigated the temporal 
relation between the appearance in the expe-
rimental subjects of the conscious urge to 
perform an action, and the beginning in the 
brain of the neurophysiological processes 
that lay behind that urge. 
In the most famous of his experiments,8 
he asked experimental subjects to periodical-
ly raise a finger, freely, while at the same time 
they had to look at a clock with a rotating 
spot. In order to time the appearance of the 
conscious will, they were supposed to re-
member where the dot on the clock-face was 
when they had the urge to move their finger. 
Moreover, Libet used electro-encephalogram 
machines (EEG) to record, during the task, 
electrical signals from the scalp of experi-
mental subjects. 
What Libet found was a 200 millisecond 
delay, on average, between the appearance of 
the conscious urge to move a finger (called W 
and registered with an electromyogram 
which shows relevant muscular motion to 
begin) and the movement itself.  But the EEG 
recordings also revealed the presence of a 
scalp potential, called the readiness potential 
(RP), that appears in the brain even earlier – 
550 milliseconds, on average – before the ac-
tion. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Libet’s results 
   -550 ms -200 ms 0 ms 
RP W Action starts 
Libet interpreted the data and concluded 
that the cerebral activity, identified with RP, 
represents the effective cause of the intentio-
nal process that leads to the execution of a 
free voluntary movement. In this picture, 
conscious will (W) seems to be only epiphe-
nomenal: it has no role in causing actions, be-
cause it appears in the subject when the brain 
processes are already started: it is, then, 
constantly “after the facts”.9 
 
█ Free will or metaphysical freedom? 
 
Libet’s thesis is that his empirical findings 
clearly dismiss the possibility for human agents 
of possessing free will, that is, the ability of 
consciously cause their own actions. In fact, ac-
cording to Libet’s interpretation of the data, 
these show that while the brain is the effective 
originator of our actions, consciousness – 
which is straightforwardly equated to free will 
– has no role in causing our actions. 
One common strategy in assessing Libet’s 
results is to ask whether Libet’s empirical da-
ta are a genuine problem for the existence of 
free will. My strategy in this paper, however, 
is slightly different: I aim to ask why Libet’s 
results are perceived, by Libet himself to 
begin with, as a real threat to the existence of 
free will. The answer to this question is that 
the reason is in its essence a conceptual one: 
Libet’s results are perceived as undermining 
the existence of free will because of one’s ta-
king for granted a particular understanding 
of such a concept. 
It is possible to detect two main aspects in 
Libet’s interpretation of the data which seem 
to make them worrisome: a temporal aspect 
and an awareness aspect.  
 
(a) Temporal aspect. If the brain’s activities 
start before the appearance of the consci-
ous will, then conscious will, which is 
temporally delayed in respect to them, 
cannot be considered as the origin of our 
willed actions. 
 
(b) Awareness aspect. Everything the agent is 
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unaware of is a problem for free will: an 
action, whose causes are unconscious, 
cannot be considered a free action.   
 
Libet’s experiment is, then, immediately 
perceived as a threat to free will because it 
seems to undermine a powerful idea: that the 
agent has to be the source of his own decisi-
ons and actions. More explicitly, the two as-
pects joined together suggest that the agent 
has to be the conscious originator of the 
causal chain of events which lead to an ac-
tion, and that this feature guarantees that he 
is the free source of his actions. 
Furthermore, according to Libet, there is 
another aspect in the picture suggested by his 
data which strongly undermines the exis-
tence of free will: the hypothetical determi-
nistic character of the brain’s activity. In Li-
bet’s words: 
 
We have not answered the question of 
whether our consciously willed acts are 
fully determined by natural laws that 
govern the activity of the nerve cells in 
the brain, or whether acts and the consci-
ous decisions to perform them can pro-
ceed to some degree independently of na-
tural determinism. The first of these opti-
ons would make free will illusory […] We 
would not need to view ourselves as ma-
chines that act in a manner completely 
controlled by the known physical laws.10 
 
In this passage, Libet admittedly perceives 
the hypothetical existence of deterministic 
trends in the brain’s activities as an in-
surmountable problem for free will, though 
presenting his results as not conclusive in this 
direction. 
The overall connotation of free will which 
emerges from these remarks is, accordingly, a 
very specific one: that the ability of exer-
cising free will requires by definition a non-
physical element, which can sidestep the risk 
of deterministic behaviour and which can be 
identified with the agent himself as a causal 
origin of his action. In this perspective, phy-
sical operations of the brain and, even more, 
their possibly deterministic trends are per-
ceived by Libet as deeply incompatible with 
an acceptable conception of free will, while 
the conscious will seems to be the correct 
place where to locate free will. 
The validity of such claims is, however, an 
old topic of discussion in the philosophical 
debate about free will. Specifically, Libet’s 
position is easily attributable to a family of 
philosophical positions in the free will deba-
te: incompatibilism. Indeed, according to 
such a view, free will is intrinsically incompa-
tible with determinism and is characterized, 
in some particular versions,11 by the follo-
wing theses:  
 
(1) Source incompatibilism. The agent, and 
not his physical substratum, has to be the 
origin of the causal chain which leads to 
the action. 
 
(2) Leeway incompatibilism. When making a 
choice, the agent has to be the effective 
source of his own decisions, by possessing 
the ability to choose between different 
courses of action. 
 
I would like to call the conception of free 
will that results from (1) and (2) Metaphysi-
cal Freedom (MF), and I suggest that both 
elements of this view are implicitly taken for 
granted by Libet. More precisely, I will argue 
that they are the reason why he perceives the 
temporal and the awareness aspects as a gen-
uine threat to free will. However, I will sug-
gest that it is possible to characterize free will 
in a way that does not presuppose the exist-
ence of MF, thereby avoiding the challenge 
of Libet’s empirical results.  
 
█ Metaphysical freedom: The temporal as-
pect 
 
The temporal aspect of Libet’s worry sug-
gests that if there are brain’s activities which 
start before the appearance of the conscious 
will, then conscious will, which is equated to 
What do Neurosciences Talk About When They Talk About Free Will? 
 
149 
free will, cannot be considered the origin of our 
willed actions. Consequently, if the conscious 
free will is not the cause of our decisions and 
actions, we are not the cause of them.  
The temporal aspect can be further eluci-
dated in two related concerns: the Epipheno-
menalist concern and the Source concern. I ar-
gue that Libet explicitly recognizes the for-
mer, and that he is brought from it to get clo-
se to share the latter. 
The Epiphenomenalist concern asks whe-
ther, in the explanation of voluntary actions, 
consciousness plays a role in the initiation of 
bodily movement. It distinctively answers 
that the causal efficacy has to be entirely at-
tributed to neural mechanisms, but not to 
consciousness. That is, while neural events 
cause bodily movement and consciousness, 
consciousness cannot cause neural events. In 
this picture, consciousness is only an epiphe-
nomenon: we think that it is the cause of our 
voluntary activity while the truth is that it is 
not. Accordingly, the epiphenomenalist in-
terpretation of Libet’s results states that what 
we call free will is nothing more than a 
mistaken impression, an illusion, because our 
voluntary actions are completely caused by 
physical brain activities.12 
It is a common view in philosophy that ac-
tions can be free only if there is a conscious, 
mental activity which directly causes them13. 
However, it is possible to recognize behind 
such a claim at least two flaws (both displayed 
even by epiphenomenalism). The first flaw lies 
in the certainty that only a causal-effective 
conscious dimension can guarantee that the 
agent is the cause of his actions. The second 
flaw lies in the straightforward equation of the 
mind’s conscious activity to free will. It seems 
indeed that Libet understands the pheno-
menon of free will exactly in these flawed 
terms: if conscious mental events do not ope-
rate as a cause that moves or directs the body, 
then we do not possess free will.  
For the purposes of rejecting Libet’s posi-
tion, I will show why the first claim is fla-
wed.14 Following Daniel Dennett, Libet’s po-
sition can be called Cartesian materialism.15 
According to Cartesian materialism, so-
mewhere in the brain there is a place where a 
hypothetical observer could always “find” the 
content of conscious experience. Dennett’s 
arguments show that Cartesian materialism is 
an out-dated position in the debate about 
consciousness.  
Indeed, such a position is still centred in 
Descartes’ idea of the existence in the brain of 
some centralized and separated “storage”, 
where the contents of consciousness are com-
bined and assembled, a place Dennett calls the 
“Cartesian theatre”. In these respects, both e-
piphenomenalism and Libet seem to suggest 
an obsolete picture of conscious free will, in 
which consciousness is still a sort of homuncu-
lus, which contemplates as a spectator what 
happens in the theatre of the mind. 
Such an interpretation of his data seems 
to get Libet close to the Source concern (1) of 
the conception of free will that I have called 
Metaphysical Freedom (MF). In short, MF 
says that the agent, and not his physical sub-
stratum, has to be the origin of the causal 
chain which leads to the action. Such a posi-
tion holds that an action is free if it is caused 
and controlled by the agent in a distinctive 
self-determining way, a way that is incompa-
tible with deterministic causation. According 
to this view, even if we are apparently able to 
conduct our everyday actions, to be truly free 
agents we must be the “ultimate sources” of 
our decisions. In other words, we can make 
free choices only if we cause our choices and 
nothing causes us to cause them. 
The soundness of such a position in the free 
will debate is however strongly objected. More 
generally, it is at least a matter of discussion if a 
position which perceives as deeply problematic 
the existence of physical, mechanistic causation 
in our bodies is at all acceptable from the point 
of view of our current scientific theories. The 
affinity between Libet’s position and Source In-
compatibilism shows that what is missing in Li-
bet’s theory is an acceptance of an even basic 
physicalist position: that is, that mental events 
are correlated in some way with physical events 
in the brain.16  
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But if this is true, it is possible to reject as 
a false problem the fact that our actions are 
caused by a chain of (physical) events. In 
such a picture, it is not very surprising that 
the brain is doing something while the agent 
is making a decision or an action. From a ba-
sic physicalist point of view, the temporal 
factor in Libet’s experiments is no longer a 
deep source of worry: why should we consi-
der the timing of consciousness as a singular 
instant? It is more realistic, also at a pheno-
menological level, to understand conscious-
ness as a process which is linked with some 
physical activities of the brain: in this light, 
there should be some extended brain event 
that underlies the process of conscious awa-
reness.17 
My suggestion, then, is that Libet’s impli-
cit endorsing of an incompatibilist position 
about free will is the actual reason of his deep 
worry about the temporal aspect of his fin-
dings. Only under such theoretical assumpti-
ons he is brought to perceive as “mysterious” 
the small temporal gap between brain proces-
ses and the appearance of the conscious awa-
reness. If one rejects Libet’s incompatibilist 
position, the “mysterious thing” would 
become instead the absence of some process 
in the brain that corresponds, and even pre-
cedes, our decisions. 
 
█ Metaphysical freedom: The awareness 
aspect 
 
The awareness aspect of Libet’s worry sug-
gests that if the causes of an action are not 
immediately transparent to the conscience of 
the subject, namely if they are “unconscious”, 
the ability to exercise free will is in serious 
troubles. Indeed, if the causes of an action are 
unconscious (as the physical ones seem to be), 
the agent is not really participating in choosing 
to perform that action, that is instead brought 
about by the activity of the brain.18 
Such interpretation of his findings seems 
to get Libet close to thesis (2) of MF. In this 
sense, Libet seems to accept the controversial 
philosophical claim that, when making a 
choice, the agent has to be the effective 
source of his own decisions by possessing the 
ability to causally choose between different 
courses of action. Indeed, if the causal de-
terminants of an action are unconscious, as 
Libet’s data seem to suggest, then one intui-
tive and unpleasant consequence would be 
the impossibility for the agent to have any 
conscious role in the choice of starting one 
course of action instead of another.19 
In philosophical terms, this particular abi-
lity for the agent is usually called ‘metaphysi-
cal ability to do otherwise’ and it is a central 
feature of the MF. It states that the existence 
of real, metaphysical alternative possibilities 
(or the agent's power to do otherwise) is a 
necessary condition for acting freely, and 
that determinism is not compatible with al-
ternative possibilities, because it precludes 
the power to do otherwise for the agent.20 
However, the claim that the agent has to 
necessarily possess metaphysical alternative 
possibilities in order to be a free agent is a 
much contested statement in the free will de-
bate. According to the proponents of compa-
tibilist theories, it is indeed possible to exer-
cise a robust ability to act freely without pos-
sessing the ability to do otherwise and, thus, 
even if determinism is true. A significant ar-
gument in this direction is represented by the 
series of counterexamples developed by Har-
ry Frankfurt,21 which were intended to argue 
against the common thesis that moral 
responsibility necessarily requires the ability 
to do otherwise for the agents. 
Frankfurt’s examples involve agents who 
are intuitively morally responsible for their 
behaviour even though they lack metaphysi-
cal alternative possibilities. Frankfurt’s ar-
gument was developed exactly to argue for 
moral responsibility; however, it is intuitively 
plausible to affirm that in Frankfurt-
scenarios agents also act in a free manner. 
Here is a typical Frankfurt-scenario: 
 
In the next election, Donald is likely to 
vote for the Democrats; in fact, he will 
not vote in such a way only in one particu-
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lar circumstance: that is, if he thinks 
about the possibility of American defeat 
in Iraq just prior to voting. Ms White, a 
member of the Democratic Party, wants 
to make sure that Donald votes De-
mocratic, so she secretly put a device in 
Donald’s head that, if activated, will force 
him to vote Democratic. However, as to 
not reveal her presence, Ms White will ac-
tivate the device only if Donald will think 
about the Iraq War prior to voting, thus 
risking to not voting Democrat. As things 
happen, Donald does not think about Iraq 
prior to voting, and Ms White has no 
reason to activate the device: Donald vo-
tes Democratic of his own free will. 
 
Such an example clearly seems to suggest 
that there are cases in which an agent does 
act freely even if he does not practically pos-
sess alternative possibilities in the actual sce-
nario of events: Donald, in the previous exa-
mple, could only vote Democratic, but he has 
nevertheless voted in this way in full consci-
ousness and freedom. 
Frankfurt-scenarios help in underlying 
that the ability to do otherwise is not a neces-
sary requisite for exercising free will. By mak-
ing use of a terminology introduced by John 
Martin Fisher,22 it is possible to distinguish 
between two kinds of control which an agent 
can have when performing an action. If the 
agent possesses regulative control, he possess-
es the power to perform an action freely and, 
at the same time, the power to do otherwise; 
if an agent possesses guidance control, he only 
possesses the power to perform an action 
freely but not the power to perform another 
action instead. 
In a Frankfurt-scenario, an agent acts 
freely but at the same time he is not able to 
do otherwise, due to an external intervention, 
which would block an alternative course of 
action by manipulating the agent’s brain. In 
such a case, the actual course of action is a 
free one, and the agent is responsible for his 
choice in performing that action, even if he is 
not really able to do otherwise. In Fisher’s 
terminology, in such a case the agent possess-
es guidance control while he clearly lacks 
regulative control. Therefore, in order to be a 
free agent, an agent only needs to possess 
guidance control over his actions.  
I would like to suggest, then, that Libet’s 
implicit endorsing of an incompatibilist posi-
tion about free will is the actual reason of his 
deep worry about the awareness aspect of his 
findings. Libet’s incompatibilist claim, ac-
cording to which the presence of physical 
(probably deterministic) and unconscious 
causes lying behind our actions reveals the 
illusory of free will, can thus be rejected from 
a philosophical point of view, by rejecting in-
compatibilism and making use of Frankfurt’s 
cogent counterexamples. 
 
█ Against Libet: The epistemic freedom 
 
In this section, I would like to suggest an 
alternative view to Metaphysical Freedom 
and argue that in order to exercise free will it 
is only necessary to possess a more modest 
ability, namely the ability to exercise Episte-
mic Freedom during the act of deliberation. 
My aim is then to point out that it is possible 
to maintain a different understanding of free 
will which is not influenced by Libet’s expe-
rimental discoveries, because they are by no 
means relevant with respect to the existence 
of such ability for human agents. 
The idea of epistemic freedom can be 
made clear by focusing on the process of de-
liberation. It seems that a typical human 
being is able to engage, most of the time, in 
deliberation and practical reasoning. In the 
process of practical deliberation, agents usu-
ally reflect upon and weight reasons for ac-
ting (or not acting) in a certain way. In the 
scenario brought about by Libet, it is alleged 
that an agent lacks the ability to do otherwi-
se, because the causes of his actions are not 
consciously available to him.  
However, it can be argued that even in 
such a scenario there is still a sense and a 
purpose for practical deliberation. Consider 
again Donald’s situation. He has to choose 
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between voting Democratic or Republican, 
but this time, while he deliberates about this 
decision, he is also aware that he lives in a de-
terministic world and that his choice is al-
ready determined by his biological makeup 
and brain’s functions.  It seems that, even if 
this is the case, Donald cannot avoid choo-
sing which party he is going to vote. This is 
because, even if he knows that determinism 
is true, and that his antecedent psychological 
and physical states are causally sufficient to 
determine his decision, it does not follow 
that he knows what decision he will make and 
so which party he will vote. He still has to 
make a decision. 
More precisely, according to David Vel-
leman what happens in a scenario like this is 
that there always are different epistemic 
descriptions of the future available to the 
agent when he deliberates.23 In other words, 
Donald is entailed to say whenever he wants, 
because he will vote the party he wants. Of 
course in a deterministic scenario there is only 
one possible choice for Donald, so he will ac-
tually vote only one party: the one that is pre-
determined. However, the evident lack of a 
unique true answer for him to the question of 
what he will vote makes him feel that his fu-
ture is really open, that is metaphysically open. 
In such a scenario, even if Donald does 
not possess metaphysical alternative possibi-
lities, he still possesses epistemic alternatives. 
Therefore, what happens in a scenario like 
this is that, in feeling that Donald’s choice is 
open, one is mistaking epistemic for causal 
freedom.24 All that is open is not what party 
Donald is going to vote, but rather, as David 
Velleman suggests,  
 
what you would be correct in saying you are 
going to have. You mistake your license to 
say any one of various things about what 
you’ll have for the possibility that you’ll ha-
ve any one of various things.25 
 
If this is the case, then it seems possible to 
maintain a different understanding of the no-
tion of free will which does not presuppose 
the existence of a Metaphysical Freedom.  
Moreover, I suggest that Libet’s empirical 
data are not relevant at all with respect to the 
existence of an Epistemic Freedom for the 
agents during the process of deliberation. In 
Libet’s experiment, the experimental subjects 
deliberate about raising a finger. Such a pro-
cess of deliberation is in fact free with respect 
to their epistemic freedom: they possess the 
epistemic freedom, during the deliberation, 
of thinking and evaluating alternatives and 
to say that they will not raise their finger, 
even if they do not possess the ability to per-
form such different action instead. And such 
a possibility would remain true even if the 
empirical findings of Libet’s experiment are 
correct, namely if the effective beginning of 
the action is situated in an unconscious brain 
activity which takes place before the consci-
ous deliberation of the subject begins. 
 
█ Haynes’ experiment 
 
In the previous section, I offered an alter-
native view about free will and argued that 
the existence of an epistemic freedom char-
acterizes an understanding of the ability to 
act freely which does involve neither the ex-
istence of real alternative possibilities nor the 
necessity for the agent of being a metaphysi-
cal kind of cause of his actions. Moreover, I 
have shown that Libet’s experimental results 
are not relevant in respect of such an alterna-
tive characterization of free will.  
A recent experimental study conducted in 
2008 by John Dylan Haynes and colleagues26 
seem to represent a potential worry for the 
existence of epistemic freedom for agents. 
The experiment’s results are relevant for our 
purposes because they focus on the notion of 
predictability. Instead of showing, as in 
Libet’s case, that our actions are in general 
terms determined by unconscious cerebral 
causes, the experiment aims to investigate if 
it is possible to predict future actions by 
looking at cerebral processes at work during 
the act of deliberation. 
First, I will briefly describe Haynes’ exper-
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imental setting. Then, I will address the chal-
lenge of predictability for a satisfactory con-
ception of free will. Accordingly, I will ask 
whether it is possible to describe a theoreti-
cally plausible notion of freedom even in the 
presence of revealed predictions. Although I 
hope to show that Haynes’s experiment can-
not be considered in the end as a real worry 
for epistemic freedom, I will however, for the 
sake of the argument, follow Haynes’ direc-
tions in setting up an imaginary neuroscien-
tific and Laplacian scenario, and ask what 
would remain of free will in such a picture. 
 
█ The experimental setting 
 
In Haynes’ experiment, experimental sub-
jects had to decide whether to push a right or 
left button. They were supposed to perform 
this action periodically and freely. Haynes 
used Functional Magnetic Resonance Imag-
ine (fMRI), an advanced technique of analy-
sis in neuroimaging, in order to look at pat-
terns of activations in small regions of the 
brain, and see whether those patterns could 
be interpreted to predict future actions.  
Experimental data suggest that there are 
two main regions of the brain which are in-
volved in the decision process: front-polar 
cortex and parietal cortex. The decoding of 
these areas, by means of a dedicated soft-
ware, shows that, on average, 7 to 10 seconds 
before the subjects press the button, neuro-
scientists are able to predict whether they are 
going to push the right or left button. 
Empirical results are then interpreted 
sharply by Haynes. According to him, the 
controversy as to whether subjectively “free” 
decisions are determined by brain activity 
ahead of time is at least partially solved by his 
study, because the empirical results show that 
the outcome of a decision can be pro-
grammed in brain activity of prefrontal and 
parietal cortex up to 10 s before the appear-
ance of awareness. In this sense, even if sub-
jectively “free”, our decisions are actually up 
to the early activity of the brain, thus reduc-
ing the activity of free will to a mere illusion. 
█ The challenge of predictability 
 
The result of Haynes’ experiment is inter-
esting exactly because the neuroscientists are 
apparently able to predict the outcome of an 
agent’s decision, and they are able to do this a 
few seconds before the decision enters the 
subject’s awareness. 
What seems to happen in this scenario is a 
shift from determinism to predictability or, 
in other terms, from the possibility of an ex-
ternal predictability to the possibility of an 
embedded predictability.27 On the one hand, 
determinism in itself only entails external 
predictability. This is the possibility in prin-
ciple for an external observer, not part of the 
universe, to predict all future states of that 
universe. However, Haynes’ experiment 
seems to go further and to suggest the exist-
ence of an embedded predictability. This is 
the possibility for an embedded subsystem in 
the universe to make a prediction about a fu-
ture state of the universe itself. 
At a closer look, however, Haynes’ results 
can be shown to be at least partially harmless.  
First, overall predictions success is only an 
average over a large number of trials. In other 
words, in order to get any interpretable result, 
experimenters need to consider the average 
over many trials. Accordingly, with respect to 
any individual trial, it is impossible to predict 
which button will be pushed by an experi-
mental subject. Secondly, the percentage of 
success in predicting the outcomes of experi-
mental trials is decisively lower than 100%. At 
a closer glance, it turns out that Haynes’ pre-
dictions are successful about 55-57% of the 
trials.  
Although the result is certainly significant, 
however, as Adina Roskies suggests, a slight 
step over the chance is not enough to assert 
the predictability of human actions and to in-
fer from this that free will is an illusion.28 
However, for the purposes of understand-
ing how much the challenge of predictability 
can be harmful for free will, I would like to 
suggest the following thought experiment, 
designed to push the limits of Haynes’ results 
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in predicting human actions.  
Let’s then imagine a Laplacian scenario in 
which every outcome of any decisions of eve-
ry human being is actually predicted, and in 
which the resulting previsions are revealed to 
the agent before he acts. Whereas the Lapla-
cian demon was imagined by Laplace29 as a 
kind of God-like observer that could know 
the positions, velocities, and forces of all the 
particles in the universe at one time, and thus 
know every future state of the universe30, the 
predictor in our fictional scenario is rather a 
predictions device, a sophisticated develop-
ment of our current neuroscientific technol-
ogies. The difference between the classical 
Laplacian Demon and the prediction’s ma-
chine is significant, because whereas the for-
mer only accounts for the possibility of an 
external predictability, the latter realizes the 
hypothetical possibility of an embedded one, 
by extending the range of predictability to 
the totality of human actions. 
The question now is: how is it possible to 
preserve free will against a collection of re-
vealed predictions?31  
First, I would like to suggest that there are 
powerful reasons to believe that a scenario 
which realizes an embedded predictability is 
logically impossible, as the latter is the source 
of well-known paradoxes. Nonetheless, my 
suggestion is that such kinds of paradoxes are 
not to be considered as evidence in favor of 
the existence of a metaphysical free will. On 
the contrary, I would like to propose that it is 
possible to argue for a meaning of free will 
which is not challenged even by such an ex-
treme scenario, in which the possibility of re-
alized embedded predictability is taken for 
granted. 
It has been argued by many authors that 
there are serious epistemic limitations on the 
ability of an embedded subsystem in a de-
terministic universe to make predictions of 
future events.32 Such epistemic limitations 
arise, for example, because it is unlikely that a 
finite subsystem of the universe will ever be 
able to make exact measurements of the initial 
states of the universe.  
More radically, it can be argued that until 
the moment of the choice it is impossible to 
make a prediction about that choice because, 
in order to provide such a prediction, one 
would need all the information until the mo-
ment of the choice included.  In short, the ob-
jection rules out the very possibility of early 
predictions as impossible. 
Moreover, authors have insisted that 
there are also fundamental and stronger non-
epistemic limitations on the ability of any 
subsystem in the universe to make predic-
tions on future behaviours of other subsys-
tems embedded in the same universe.33 Con-
sequently, embedded predictability does not 
obtain even in the deterministic universe. 
The most powerful way of proving such con-
clusion is by constructing a paradoxical situa-
tion in which a subsystem of the considered 
universe makes a prediction which comes up in 
the end as necessarily self-defeating.  
Such a paradoxical situation is explained by 
Rummens and Cuyper34 by putting forward the 
hypothesis that these limitations arise because 
the predictions themselves are physical events 
which are part of the law-like causal chain of 
events in the deterministic universe. According 
to these authors,  
 
a general and complete causal uncoupling of 
our past and future activities from the pre-
dicted subsystem, would require, among 
other things, that we were capable of ob-
taining all the information needed for our 
predictions without actually disturbing the 
predicted system.35  
 
However, due to the Uncertainty Principle, 
it is unlikely that a requirement of this sort can 
ever be met. Considerations of this sort, which 
seem to deny in principle the very possibility of 
embedded predictability, are certainly useful 
to put into perspective the (already partial) 
results of Haynes’ experiment as a real threat 
to the existence of free will.  
However, it seems correct to say at the 
same time that the inference from the lack of 
embedded predictability to the possibility of 
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human freedom is hard to be drawn. This is 
mostly because there are several elements 
which constitute the ability to act freely, and 
none of them is explained or captured by the 
mere demonstration of the impossibility of 
embedded predictability.36 For this reason, in 
the next section, I would like to pursue the 
proposed thought experiment and suggest a 
characterization for the notion of free will 
which is not (or at least not entirely) chal-
lenged even if we allow the possibility of re-
vealed predictions.  
My aim is then to point out that it is pos-
sible to maintain a different understanding of 
free will which is not influenced by Haynes’ 
experimental discoveries, because they are not 
relevant with respect to such characterization 
of free will. 
 
█ Against Haynes: The sense of free will 
 
Imagine that the following situation 
holds. I live in such a Laplacian world, in 
which every outcome of any decisions of 
mine is actually predicted by a prediction’s 
device. Today, I am in front of a much seri-
ous choice: to carry on working on this paper 
or, instead, to go out for a relaxing walk un-
der the sun of this early afternoon. Further-
more, I have in front of me a piece of paper 
with the relevant prediction made by the 
prediction’s machine, and I read it carefully: 
it says that I will decide to go out for a walk. 
Indeed, through a process of deliberation, I 
effectively decide to take a pause and go out 
for a walk. Now, is it possible to consider 
such an action as freely performed? 
To explain how it is conceivable to an-
swer the affirmative, I would like to carry on 
a modified version of a line of argument in-
troduced by Peter Strawson in his well-
known paper Freedom and Resentment.37 
Strawson’s purpose, in this famous paper, 
is to overcome the problem of the compatibi-
lity between determinism and moral respon-
sibility. His strategy consists in leaving apart 
common conceptual issues about the analysis 
of “freedom” and “responsibility”, by consi-
dering what actually happens when we hold a 
person responsible. His argument is that our 
‘reactive attitudes’ towards others and ours-
elves, attitudes such as gratitude, anger or re-
sentment, on which moral responsibility is 
based, are natural and unchangeable.  
That is, they cannot be considered from 
an objective stance. In this sense, why should 
we think that accepting the truth of determi-
nism will change our stance towards reactive 
attitudes? First, we are not practically able to 
give them up, because they are too deeply 
rooted in our human nature. Secondly, ac-
cording to Strawson, to give them up because 
of the truth of determinism is not even ratio-
nal because, in practical terms, we would not 
receive any kind of benefit from such a rejec-
tion. 
As for the case of moral responsibility, I 
would like to suggest that what is really im-
possible (and not even rational) to get rid of 
for human agents is the sense of freedom 
which we usually perceive during the process 
of deliberation. Such a sense of freedom, I 
suggest, is the minimum requirement for a 
satisfactory notion of free will. 
To see this clearly, consider again the im-
agined Laplacian scenario and my choice of 
going out for a walk, even when the outcome 
of such a choice is available to me as a re-
vealed prediction. In this case, if I do not see 
any plausible reason to not going out, and I 
effectively go out, there is a deep sense for 
which my choice would be perceived by me 
as actually mine. The prediction, from my 
point of view, just happens to coincide with 
the choice I weighted in a process of delibera-
tion. As Strawson suggests, then, what we do 
when we consider a person (or ourselves) a 
free agent is to take a particular stance on 
them, a stance from which I cannot avoid to 
consider others and myself as a free agent. 
That is because our sense of free agency is so 
profoundly incorporated in our agential prac-
tices to render practically impossible its aban-
don, even in front of revealed predictions. 
However, I suggest that there is another 
deeper reason to maintain that it is impossible 
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for human agents to abandon a sense of free-
dom during the act of deliberation. In the La-
placian scenario I am taking into account, the 
reason why I perceive the choice of going out 
for a walk as mine, even if a prediction of such 
decision is available to me, is that such a 
choice of mine is perfectly in line with my per-
sonality and my reasons for acting: I can rec-
ognize myself as present in such a decision.  
I propose that a possible explanation for 
this can be found in the claim that agency pos-
sesses not only a physical dimension but also a 
normative one:38 when we deliberate, from a 
first-person point of view we are forced to 
build a personal identity which counts as a 
normative regulation for our actions. 
First of all, it should be noticed that the pro-
cess of deliberation, which is essential in order 
to effectively act, is made possible by the reflec-
tive structure of our mind.39 To say that the 
human mind is self-reflective is to underline a 
distinguishing feature of our cognitive architec-
ture, namely the fact that human beings ac-
quire, during their natural development, the 
ability to step back from impulses and to un-
dertake a process of reflection upon percep-
tions. In this reflection, we are able to form rea-
sons from perception, which are essential in or-
der to engage in practical activities. 
Then, when we undergo a process of de-
liberation to answer the question “what to 
do”, the reflective structure of the mind is the 
source of a sort of “self-consciousness”, be-
cause it compels us to have a conception of 
ourselves: there is a “unified self”, a coherent 
personality, which is able to find reasons in 
favour or against most of the decisions of our 
everyday life.  
I would like to suggest that, even in the 
presence of revealed predictions, from a sub-
jective stance we would be compelled to feel 
that there actually is a “unified self”, which 
chooses actions in accordance with our own 
conception of ourselves. It is under such a 
“practical identity”, which is continuously 
shaped by the same process of deliberation, 
that a desire can be recognized as chosen by us 
as a reason for acting, thus counting as a nor-
mative regulation for our choices.  
The sense of freedom during deliberation 
is then justifyed by the fact that, from a sub-
jective and normative stance, we are forced 
to understand our decisions as in line with 
our practical identities. That we occupy such 
an intentional, deliberative stance most of the 
time, and that we consider ourselves as free and 
active agents through this, is not in any way a 
pragmatic choice. On the contrary, it is exactly 
the necessary outcome of how our agency is 
constituted: by learning how to weigh reasons 
in the process of deliberation, we also learn the 
ability of being, from a first-person and norma-
tive perspective, free agents.40 
It seem then possible to argue that there is 
a strong sense in which we are structurally 
forced to perceive ourselves as active and free 
agents even in the imagined scenario brought 
about by Haynes’ experiment. In this differ-
ent understanding, free will is not regarded as 
a metaphysical and theoretical property of 
the self (as both Libet and Haynes seem to 
presuppose), but rather as a consequence of 
the reflective structure of our mind, as a nat-
ural ability of the agent. As a result, I aimed 
to suggest that there is a possible characteri-
zation of free will which can survive even the 
challenge of predictability. And if this is cor-
rect, Haynes’ empirical results are by no 
means significant with respect to such an al-




The aim of this paper was to suggest a dif-
ferent reading of some well-known neurosci-
entific experiments about free will. While phi-
losophical analyses of these experiments are 
usually focused on asking whether experimen-
tal findings represent a threat to free will, I 
rather asked why such empirical data are per-
ceived by many as worrisome.  
In answering this question, I showed that 
the reason is at its essence a philosophical one: 
experimental results are perceived as under-
mining the existence of free will because of 
one’s taking for granted a particular under-
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standing of such a notion. In the light of this, I 
aimed to suggest that the same success or fai-
lure of the experiments is strictly dependent 
on the notion of free will which is put through 
experimental investigation. I sketched a num-
ber of arguments aiming to show that it is pos-
sible to reject the experiment’s results by 
simply suggesting alternative but equally plau-
sible understandings of free will, which are not 
challenged by neuroscientific empirical fin-
dings.  
In the case of Libet’s experiment, I argued 
that Libet’s implicit endorsing of an incompa-
tibilist position about free will is the actual 
reason of his deep concern about its exis-
tence. Then, I went on to suggest an alterna-
tive view of free will which is not threatened 
by Libet’s experiment at all. 
In the case of Hayne’s experiment, I ar-
gued that his conclusions are too rushed in 
evaluating as irremediably dangerous the 
challenge of predictability for free will. Inde-
ed, after expounding why predictability is in-
tuitively seen as a worry for free will, I show-
ed how an alternative understanding of free 
will would remain untouched even in a La-
placian scenario in which an embedded pre-
dictability systematically obtains. 
In short, this paper’s main message is that 
it is not entirely clear what neurosciences are 
talking about when they talk about free will. 
This is because, crucially, ‘free will’ is said in 
many ways. To be sure, one can legitimately 
ask if the varieties of free will which I pushed 
against the empirical data are in the end satis-
factory or plausible. The answer to this ques-
tion, I suppose, is inevitably uncertain, especi-
ally from a philosophical point of view. How-
ever, the methodological point I intended to 
stress remains valid: without preliminary con-
ceptual analysis, neuroscientific experiments 
on free will run the risk of being blind or to 
miss theoretically interesting points.  
In this respect, conceptual inquiries have 
indeed the merit of investigating and cla-
rifying what we are talking about when using 
a concept like that of free will. In this light, 
their bigger merit is probably the one of as-
king and discussing what the relevant fea-
tures are of a notion of free will which is in 
the end worth defending41 and even worth to 
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